Moses v. YouTube by United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee
  
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
WESTERN DIVISION 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
PAMELA MOSES, ) 
) 
 Plaintiff,                 ) 
)  
vs.                              )     No. 12-2822-JPM-dkv 
 ) 
YOUTUBE, INC., et al., ) 
) 
 Defendant.                 ) 
 
 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS  
  
On September 21, 2012, the plaintiff, Pamela Moses 
(“Moses”), filed a pro se Complaint for copyright and trademark 
infringement, (Pro Se Compl., D.E. 1), accompanied by a motion 
seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (D.E. 2). On 
September 24, 2012, the court issued an order granting Moses 
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, (D.E. 3), and subsequently 
referred the case to the pro se staff attorney for screening.  
On January 9, 2013, Moses filed a motion for leave to amend and 
supplement her original complaint, (Pro Se Mot. to Amend Compl., 
D.E. 27), which the court granted on January 31, 2013, (Order 
Granting Leave to Amend, D.E. 45).   This case has now been 
referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for management 
and for all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and 
recommendation as appropriate.  (Order of Referral, D.E. 77.)  
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Before the court are the November 29, 2012 and February 28, 
2013 motions to dismiss the complaint and amended complaint 
filed by the defendant, Shira Krasnow (“Krasnow”), for lack of 
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 16; 
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 65.)   Also before the court is the 
January 23, 2013 motion to dismiss Krasnow’s amended complaint 
filed by the defendants, YouTube, Inc.,
1
 YouTube, LLC, and 
Google, Inc.
2
 (collectively, “YouTube”), for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
or bifurcate and stay claims under Rule 42(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 37.)   
Moses filed a response in opposition to defendant Krasnow’s 
November 29, 2012 motion to dismiss on December 7, 2012, (Pro Se 
Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 20), and Krasnow filed a 
reply on December 18, 2012, (Def.’s Reply, D.E. 24).  Moses also 
filed a response in opposition to defendant YouTube’s motion to 
dismiss on February 21, 2013, (Pro Se Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to 
Dismiss, D.E. 63), and YouTube replied on March 11, 2013, 
(Def.’s Reply, D.E. 68).  After Moses filed her amended 
complaint and supplement to her original complaint, Krasnow 
filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of 
                                                          
1
  YouTube, Inc. no longer exists as a corporate entity. 
2
  Moses alleges Google is the owner of YouTube.  (Pro Se 
Compl. D.E. 1, ¶¶ 28, 32.) 
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personal jurisdiction on February 28, 2012.  (Def.’s Mot. to 
Dismiss, D.E. 65.)   Moses did not respond to Krasnow’s motion 
to dismiss her amended complaint for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  For the reasons set forth below, it is 
recommended that Krasnow and YouTube’s motions to dismiss be 
granted.   
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This action arises out of the alleged infringement of 
Moses’s 2005 copyright in a sound recording for “Pimpin Pretty” 
and her trademark rights in the brand, logo, music, and name of 
“Pimpin Pretty” — along with other variations on that name 
including “Pretty Pimp” and “Pimp Pretty.”  (Pro Se Compl., D.E. 
1 ¶¶ 18, 19, 23.)   Moses is a recording artist and songwriter 
with a record publishing company called Let It B Known Records 
(“LIBK Records”).  (Pro Se Compl., D.E. 1 ¶ 6.)   Moses alleges 
that the defendant Krasnow uploaded her video entitled “Pimp 
Pretty” to the YouTube site and “used the protected sound 
recording, logo/picture, and trade dress/mark to begin and 
promote the infringed work.”  (Pro Se Am. Compl., D.E. 1 ¶ 33.)   
Moses sues the YouTube defendants for authorizing and deriving 
profit from the distribution of Krasnow’s “Pimp Pretty” video.  
(Pro Se Compl., D.E. 1 ¶¶ 28, 31, 32.)    
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Moses’s complaint and supplemental amended complaint3 are 
lengthy and unwieldy, making her claims for relief difficult to 
identify.  She asserts eleven claims against Krasnow and YouTube 
for violations of the Copyright Act of 1976, the Tennessee 
Trademark Act, and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act:
4
 (1) 
direct copyright infringement based on substantial similarities 
in public performance; (2) direct copyright infringement based 
on public display; (3) direct copyright infringement based on 
reproduction; (4) inducement of copyright infringement; (5) 
contributory copyright infringement; (6) vicarious copyright 
infringement; (7) trademark infringement; (8) contributory 
tarnishment; (9) vicarious dilution; (10) contributory dilution; 
and (11) vicarious tarnishment.  (Pro Se Compl., D.E. 1 ¶¶ 53-
95; Pro Se Am. Compl., D.E. 49 ¶¶ 66-92.) 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Krasnow’s Rule 12(b)(2) Motion to Dismiss 
1.   Standard for Rule 12(b)(2) Dismissal 
Krasnow moves to dismiss Moses’s lawsuit, asserting that 
the court lacks personal jurisdiction over her.  As a 
preliminary matter, this court’s federal subject matter 
                                                          
3
  The court treats Moses’s Amended Complaint and Supplement 
as a supplement to her original complaint and construes the 
documents together. 
4
  Moses does not distinguish which claims she brings against 
each defendant, often referring to the defendants collectively.  
The court presumes she brings each claim against each defendant 
for purposes of this report and recommendation. 
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jurisdiction is based on Moses’s federal claim of copyright 
infringement and trademark dilution.  Where, as here, the 
federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction stems from a federal 
question, personal jurisdiction over a defendant exists “if the 
defendant is amenable to service of process under the [forum] 
state’s long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction would not deny the defendant[] due process.”  Mich. 
Coal. of Radioactive Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954 
F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir. 1992)(internal citations omitted).  
Tennessee’s long-arm statute extends to the limits of the due 
process clause.  Payne v. Motorists’ Mut. Ins. Cos., 4 F.3d 452, 
454 (6th Cir. 1993).  “Where a state long-arm statute extends to 
the limits of the due process clause, the two inquiries are 
merged and the court need only determine whether exercising 
personal jurisdiction violates constitutional due process.”  
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publ’g, 327 F.3d 
472, 477 (6th Cir. 2003).   
Depending on the nature of the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum state, personal jurisdiction can be either general or 
specific.  Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 873 (6th Cir. 2002).  
General jurisdiction exists where the defendant’s contacts with 
the forum state are so “continuous and systematic” that 
jurisdiction is proper even when the suit does not arise out of 
the defendant’s actions or contacts within the forum state. 
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Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 
414 (1984); Third Nat’l Bank v. WEDGE Grp., Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 
1089 (6th Cir. 1989).  Specific jurisdiction is properly 
exercised when the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts 
with the forum state.  See Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. 
Safetech Int’l, 503 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 2007).  The Sixth 
Circuit applies a three-part test in determining whether 
specific jurisdiction exists, as established in Southern Machine 
Company v. Mohasco Industries, Inc.: 
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the 
privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a 
consequence in the forum state.  Second, the cause of 
action must arise from the defendant's activities there.  
Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequence caused by 
the defendant must have a substantial enough connection 
with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction 
over the defendant reasonable. 
 
401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir. 1968). 
In the context of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the burden of 
establishing personal jurisdiction is on the plaintiff.  Welsh 
v. Gibbs, 631 F.2d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 1980).  “[I]n the face of 
a properly supported motion for dismissal, the plaintiff may not 
stand on his pleadings but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set 
forth specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.”  
Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991).  
“Where . . . the court relies solely on written submissions and 
affidavits to resolve a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, rather than 
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resolving the motion after either an evidentiary hearing or 
limited discovery, the burden on the plaintiff is ‘relatively 
slight,’ and ‘the plaintiff must make only a prima facie case 
showing that personal jurisdiction exists in order to defeat 
dismissal.’  Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, 503 
F.3d 544, 549 (6th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted)(quoting Am. 
Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988) and 
Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458).  In that instance, the court 
views the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to 
the plaintiff.  Id.  Because the court did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or allow limited discovery, Moses must make 
only a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. 
Moses’s arguments for personal jurisdiction are contained 
in both her response in opposition to Krasnow’s motion to 
dismiss and in her amended complaint.  (Pro Se Resp. in Opp’n to 
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 20; Pro Se Am Compl., D.E. 49.)   
Because Moses does not indicate whether she contends that 
Krasnow is subject to general or specific jurisdiction, the 
court analyzes both possibilities.   
2.   General Jurisdiction 
As to general jurisdiction, Moses argues that Krasnow’s 
residence is a contested fact.  (See Pro Se Resp. in Opp’n to 
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 20 at 2.)   Moses asserts that 
“[i]t is a contested fact where Shira Krasnow resides today[,]” 
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Krasnow “was in Tennessee in 2007 doing business based on 
[Krasnow’s] affidavit,” and Krasnow may be a “dual resident” 
because she obtained an attorney in Jackson, Tennessee.  (Pro Se 
Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 20 at 2.)   In 
her affidavit in support of her motion to dismiss, Krasnow 
states under oath that she is a resident of Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania.  (Krasnow Aff., D.E. 65-2 ¶¶ 2-3.)   Moses 
acknowledged as much in her original complaint: “Defendant Shira 
Krasnow aka ‘Lil Miss Muffin’ is a non-established fraudulent 
‘wannabe’ rapper/dancer resides in Pittsburgh, PA.”  (Pro Se 
Compl., D.E. 1 ¶ 24.)   Krasnow denies ever doing business in 
the state of Tennessee and states that “her only physical 
contact with the state has been a personal visit unrelated to 
anything regarding the subject matter of this lawsuit.”  (Id. at 
2; Krasnow Aff., D.E. 16-2 ¶¶ 3-4.)   She further denies dual 
residency in Jackson, Tennessee as a “bare assertion” with no 
factual support.  (Def.’s Reply, D.E. 24 at 4.) 
The court agrees with Krasnow that Moses’s assertions 
regarding Krasnow’s residency in Tennessee are unsupported by 
specific facts or information that go beyond the pleadings.  As 
set out above, Moses’s original complaint states that Krasnow 
resides in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  (Pro Se Compl., D.E. 1 ¶ 
24.)   Her later allegations that Krasnow may have “dual 
citizenship” are vague, stated in unsure terms, and not 
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corroborated by affidavit or other evidence.  As to Krasnow’s 
alleged business trip to Tennessee in 2007, Moses incorrectly 
relies on Krasnow’s affidavit for that assertion (“Krasnow’s 
affidavit”), which specifically states that the trip was 
personal.  (See Pro Se Resp. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, 
D.E. 20 at 2; Krasnow Aff., D.E. 16-2 ¶ 3.)   Viewing Moses’s 
pleadings in a light most favorable to Moses, as the court is 
required to do, see Safetech Int’l, 503 F.3d at 549, Moses’s 
allegations do not establish the kind of continuous and 
systematic contacts with Tennessee that would give rise to 
general jurisdiction over Krasnow.  Even if Krasnow had 
conducted a single business visit to Tennessee, it would not 
establish general jurisdiction, and Moses’s equivocal 
allegations about Krasnow’s residency likewise do not suffice.  
Accordingly, the court finds that the exercise of general 
personal jurisdiction over Krasnow is not proper.   
3.   Specific Jurisdiction 
On the issue of specific jurisdiction, Moses argues that 
Krasnow established minimum contacts with Tennessee by 
publishing the infringing video to YouTube, which was 
transmitted to viewers in Tennessee: “Krasnow . . . transmitted 
her video to Tennessee [and] purposefully targeted and directed 
the infring[ing] content to the world.”  (Pro Se Resp. in Opp’n 
to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 20 at 6.)   The court considers 
Case 2:12-cv-02822-JPM-dkv   Document 105   Filed 09/23/13   Page 9 of 24    PageID 665
10 
 
 
Moses’s argument in light of the three-prong test established in 
Mohasco Industries, 401 F.2d at 381.  
The first prong of the Mohasco Industries test asks whether 
the defendant purposefully availed herself of the privilege of 
acting in Tennessee or causing a consequence in Tennessee.  See 
id.  Purposeful availment “‘is something akin to a deliberate 
undertaking to do or cause and an act or thing to be done in 
[the forum state] or conduct which can be properly regarded as a 
prime generating cause of the effects resulting in [the forum 
state], something more than a passive availment of [the forum 
state’s] opportunities.’”  Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, 
Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 891 (6th Cir. 2002)(quoting Khalaf v. 
Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 811, 819 (Mich. 1976)).   
“The ‘purposeful availment’ requirement is satisfied when the 
defendant's contacts with the forum state ‘proximately result 
from actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial 
connection with the forum State,’ and when the defendant's 
conduct and connection with the forum are such that he ‘should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’”  
Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 
1996)(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-
75 (1985))(internal quotation marks omitted).  The requirement 
prevents a defendant from being haled into a jurisdiction on the 
basis of “random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” contacts.  Id.  
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A defendant's physical presence in the forum state is not 
required for the purposeful availment element to be satisfied. 
Id. at 1264.   
In the internet context, “[a] defendant purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of acting in a state through its website 
if the website is interactive to a degree that reveals 
specifically intended interaction with residents of the state.”  
Neogen, 282 F.3d at 890 (citing Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, 
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).  In Neogen, the 
Sixth Circuit held that merely maintaining a website does not 
constitute purposeful availment of the privilege of acting in 
the forum state: 
An Internet website by its very nature can be accessed 
internationally.  By maintaining a website in Pennsylvania, 
[the defendant] is no more benefitting from the laws of 
Michigan than from the laws of any other state.  The level of 
contact with a state that occurs simply from the fact of a 
website's availability on the Internet is therefore an 
‘attenuated’ contact that falls short of purposeful 
availment.   
 
Id.  Examples of purposeful availment via the internet include 
processing applications and granting passwords to residents of 
the state, see id. (citing Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126), and 
maintaining a website in which residents of the state can 
register domain names while accepting business of over 4,000 
residents, see Bird, 289 F.3d at 875-76.  
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Moses contends that Krasnow purposefully availed herself of 
the forum “because the tarnishment, dilution, and infringing 
content distributed by Defendants [was] published via the 
internet, monetized, and viewed in the state [of Tennessee].”  
(Pro Se Am. Compl., D.E. 49 ¶ 39.)   Moses further alleges that 
Krasnow has over 1,000,000 views on YouTube, with “over 200 
subscribers who can be linked to Tennessee.”  (Pro Se Resp. in 
Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 20 at 3.)   She adds that 
Krasnow “has also provided a link on YouTube’s site linking this 
infringed song ‘Pimp Pretty’ available for sale on Amazon.com, 
which is being promoted and marketed in Tennessee.”  (Pro Se Am. 
Compl., D.E. 49 ¶ 23.)   Krasnow denies these allegations and 
responds that they are conclusory and unsupported by affidavits 
or evidence; thus, Moses “stands on her pleadings” and fails to 
carry her burden of establishing personal jurisdiction.  (Def.’s 
Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 65-1 at 7.) 
The court agrees that no evidence, by affidavit or exhibit, 
has been provided by Moses to support her allegations that 
Krasnow has purposefully availed herself of the privilege of 
acting in Tennessee.  See Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1458.  The 
only support offered to show any action at all by Krasnow is an 
exhibit attached to Moses’s original complaint that shows a 
computer screen image, presumably of the YouTube website, that 
states “‘PIMP PRETTY-SHIRA feat.’ . . . is no longer available 
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due to a copyright claim by Pamela Mose[s].”  (Pro Se Compl., 
Ex. C, D.E. 1-1 at 8.)   An exchange of emails with YouTube is 
also provided, showing Krasnow’s response to YouTube upon 
notification of Moses’s copyright claim, (Pro Se Compl., Ex. D, 
D.E. 1-1 at 9); however, the email exchange shows no connection 
to Tennessee or its residents.   
Even accepting as true Moses’s allegation that Krasnow 
makes available the ‘Pimp Pretty’ song on Amazon.com, Moses’s 
statement that the video is “being promoted and marketed in 
Tennessee” does not provide specific enough facts to show that 
Krasnow herself engages in marketing and promoting the video to 
Tennessee residents in a substantial way.  See Compuserve, 89 
F.3d at 1263.  Moses likewise fails to provide specific facts 
showing Krasnow’s deliberate engagement of Tennessee residents 
in her allegation that Krasnow has at least 200 subscribers on 
YouTube that can be linked to Tennessee.  There is no showing 
that Moses interacted with these Tennessee subscribers in an 
intentional and meaningful way beyond merely allowing them to 
view her videos on YouTube.  See Neogen, 282 F.3d at 890.  
Finally, the act of posting a video to YouTube — a website that 
is available internationally — does not constitute purposeful 
availment merely because it can be accessed by Tennessee 
residents.  See id.  This act is too attenuated for Krasnow to 
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reasonably anticipate being haled into a court in Tennessee.  
See id.; Compuserve, 89 F.3d at 1263.   
Based on the foregoing analysis, the court finds that the 
purposeful availment requirement has not been met to establish 
personal jurisdiction over Krasnow.  Because Moses failed to 
satisfy this requirement, the court does not consider the other 
criteria discussed in Mohasco.  “Each criterion represents an 
independent requirement, and failure to meet any one of the 
three means that personal jurisdiction may not be invoked.”  
LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d 1293, 1303 (6th Cir. 
1989).  Accordingly, it is recommended that Moses’s claim 
against Krasnow be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction 
under Rule 12(b)(2). 
B. YouTube’s Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss or Bifurcate and 
Stay Under Rule 42(b) 
 
1. Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal 
YouTube moves to dismiss Moses’s suit for failure to state 
a claim on which relief can be granted.  To survive Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissal following the United States Supreme Court’s 
opinions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a complaint must 
“‘contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Courie v. 
Alcoa Wheel & Forged Prods., 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 
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2009)(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).  The court “construes the 
complaint in a light most favorable to [the] plaintiff” and 
“accepts all factual allegations as true” to determine whether 
they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.  HDC, LLC v. 
City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2012).  However, 
“pleadings that . . . are no more than conclusions[] are not 
entitled to the assumption of truth.  While legal conclusions 
can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported 
by factual allegations.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 
‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to 
relief.  Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is 
hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of 
providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but 
also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.”).   
“Pro se complaints are to be held to ‘less stringent 
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should 
therefore be liberally construed.”  Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 
380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 
710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)).  Pro se litigants, however, are not 
exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); 
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 613 (6th Cir. 
2011)(“[A] court cannot create a claim which [a plaintiff] has 
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not spelled out in his pleading.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Payne v. Sec’y of Treas., 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th 
Cir. 2003)(affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and stating, “[n]either this court 
nor the district court is required to create Payne’s claim for 
her”); cf. Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004)(“District 
judges have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro 
se litigants.”); Young Bok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App’x 506, 510 
(6th Cir. 2011)(“[W]e decline to affirmatively require courts to 
ferret out the strongest cause of action on behalf of pro se 
litigants.  Not only would that duty be overly burdensome, it 
would transform the courts from neutral arbiters of disputes 
into advocates for a particular party.  While courts are 
properly charged with protecting the rights of all who come 
before it, that responsibility does not encompass advising 
litigants as to what legal theories they should pursue.”).  
 2.  Direct Copyright Claims 
 Moses brings three claims for direct copyright infringement 
based on substantial similarities in public performance, public 
display, and reproduction.  (Pro Se Compl, D.E. 1 ¶¶ 53-69.)   
“Direct copyright infringement occurs when anyone ‘violates any 
of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner.’”  Bridgeport 
Music, Inc. v. WM Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 398 (6th Cir. 
2007)(quoting 17 U.S.C.§ 501(a)).   To state a claim for 
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copyright infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate: ‘(1) 
ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) copying of constituent 
elements of the work that are original.’”  Id. (quoting 
Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 293 (6th Cir. 
2004)).  As to the second originality requirement, “[n]ot all 
‘copying’ is actionable.”  Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 853 
(6th Cir. 2003).  The plaintiff must prove “that the work was 
independently created by the author . . . and that it possesses 
at least some minimal degree of creativity.”  Feist Publ’ns, 
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  In the 
absence of direct evidence of copying, a plaintiff can establish 
the inference by showing: “(1) access to the allegedly-infringed 
work by the defendant(s) and (2) a substantial similarity 
between the two works at issue.”  Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 
506 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 In the instant case, Moses claims she obtained a “sound 
recording copyright, trademark for ‘Pimpin Pretty’ [on] March 
20, 2005,” as well as a “copyright for the visual picture and 
logo of ‘Pimpin Pretty’” in 2005.  (Pro Se Compl., D.E. 1 ¶¶ 19-
20.)   In her response to YouTube’s motion to dismiss, she 
attached a Certificate of Registration, Form SR, For a Sound 
Recording, issued by the United States Copyright Office for 
“Pimpin’ Pretty Vol. 1,” dated March 20, 2006.  (Pro Se Resp. to 
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A, D.E. 63-2 at 2-3.)   The 
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Certificate of Registration was not attached to the original 
complaint or supplemental complaint. 
The registration creates a rebuttable presumption that 
Moses owns a copyright in this work, see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir. 
2004)(noting that a copyright registration presumptively 
establishes proof of ownership), which she identifies as a sound 
recording in her response, (Pro Se Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to 
Dismiss, D.E. 63-1 at 3).  Though her original and amended 
complaints include marketing materials featuring the name 
“Pretty Pimpin,” “Pimpin Pretty,” and other variations, Moses 
does not provide a registration for the rights in the “Pimpin 
Pretty” logo to confirm copyright ownership.  (Pro Se Compl., 
Ex. D, D.E. 1-1 at 11-18; Pro Se Am. Compl., Ex. A, D.E. 49-1 at 
2.)   
Assuming as true that Moses owns a copyright in the sound 
recording and logo of “Pimpin Pretty,” Moses does not 
sufficiently plead the copying of constituent elements of her 
work that are original.  See Bridgeport Music, 508 F.3d at 398.  
Moses states that “Krasnow misappropriated [Moses’s] copyrighted 
material and made derivatives of her song Pimpin’ Pretty,’” (Pro 
Se Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 63-1 at 3), but does 
not describe the protected and original elements of her work.  
Her bare assertion that “Defendants have publicly displayed 
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these infringing acts, derivatives, and elements of Plaintiff’s 
original works” merely states a legal conclusion, (Id. at 4); 
the court cannot create a claim for Moses describing the 
originality of her “Pimpin Pretty” sound recording that Moses 
failed to spell out in her pleading, see Brown, 415 F. App’x at 
613. 
Moses also does not describe how Krasnow’s work was a 
“derivative” of her own other than to state that the copying was 
“blatant.”  (Pro Se Am. Compl., D.E. 49 ¶ 36; Pro Se Compl., 
D.E. 1 ¶ 32.)   Based on Moses’s pleadings, the only copying 
that has been identified is the use of the name “Pretty Pimp” as 
a song title.  Again, the court is not prepared to create a 
claim for Moses by pleading the original elements of the “Pimpin 
Pretty” name that are allegedly protected under the sound 
recording copyright she obtained.  Without this factual support, 
the court cannot even begin to compare the original and 
allegedly infringing works.  See Ellis, 177 F.3d at 506.   
 In sum, Moses’s original and amended complaints do not 
“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  See Courie, 577 
F.3d at 629.  The court recommends that Moses’s direct copyright 
infringement claims be dismissed.  
3. Contributory Copyright Infringement, Vicarious 
Copyright Infringement, and Inducement of Copyright 
Infringement Claims 
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 Contributory copyright infringement, vicarious copyright 
infringement, and inducement of copyright infringement claims 
are secondary infringement claims that depend on an underlying 
direct copyright infringement claim.  See MGM Studios Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005)(establishing the 
inducement test, which holds liable “one who distributes a 
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright . . . for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties”); NCR Corp. v. Korala Assocs., Ltd., 512 F.3d 807, 816 
(6th Cir. 2008)(“Contributory infringement occurs when one, with 
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.”); 
Gordon v. Nextel Commc’ns & Mullen  Adver., Inc., 345 F.3d 922, 
926 (6th Cir. 2003)(holding that the plaintiff’s claim of 
vicarious liability could not prevail absent direct 
infringement).  Having found Moses does not state a claim for 
direct copyright infringement, the court recommends that her 
claims for secondary copyright infringement should also be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim.  
 4. Trademark Infringement Claim 
 Moses claims to own a distinct “Pimpin Pretty” trademark, 
which “[has] been promoted, market[ed], and sold” through her 
products and music.  (Pro Se Am. Compl., D.E. 49 ¶ 34.)   She 
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further asserts that Krasnow used a “nearly identical and 
confusingly similar” mark in her “Pimp Pretty” video, which “are 
likely to cause confusion, mistake, and deception” among 
consumers.  (Id. ¶ 36-37.)   To state a claim for trademark 
infringement, Moses must allege facts showing: “(1) it owns the 
registered trademark; (2) the defendant used the mark in 
commerce; and (3) the use was likely to cause confusion.”  
Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 
2009).    
 Moses’s trademark infringement claim amounts to legal 
conclusions unsupported by sufficient facts.  Moses claims to 
own the “Pimpin Pretty” mark, which the court presumes is the 
logo used on the branding materials Moses attaches to her 
original and amended complaints.
5
  (See Pro Se Compl., Ex. D., 
D.E. 1-1 at 11-18; Pro Se Am. Compl., Ex. A, D.E. 49-1 at 2.)   
However, Moses fails to describe or provide any facts about the 
allegedly confusingly similar mark used by Krasnow and uploaded 
by YouTube.  She summarily states that “Krasnow tarnished the 
famous mark “Pimpin’ Pretty” owned by . . . Moses and included 
it in the video she uploaded to the YouTube website.”  (Pro Se 
Am. Compl., D.E. 49 ¶ 25.)   However, she only supports this 
                                                          
5
  The court assumes these exhibits are Moses’s promotional 
materials simply based on their appearance.  Moses does not 
identify them or indicate their significance to this cause of 
action. 
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allegation with an exhibit that appears to be more of Moses’s 
own advertising materials.  (Pro Se Am. Compl., Ex. A, D.E. 49-1 
at 2.)   The court is left with a bare allegation and no 
indication of the mark that Krasnow used.   
Moses also fails to provide factual support for her 
allegation that YouTube uses the mark in commerce in connection 
with the sale or advertising of goods or services, as required 
by 17 U.S.C § 1127.  She states that “YouTube [and] Google 
continue to profit from the video,” but does not explain how it 
sells or advertises the allegedly infringing mark.  (Pro Se Am. 
Compl., D.E. 49 ¶ 26, 29.)   Thus, Moses offers mere conclusions 
unsupported by sufficient factual allegations.  See Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 679.  The court recommends that Moses’s trademark 
infringement claim be dismissed. 
 5. Contributory and Vicarious Trademark Dilution Claim 
 Finally, Moses asserts contributory and vicarious trademark 
dilution claims against YouTube.
6
  To state a claim for trademark 
dilution, Moses must show: “(1) the senior mark [is] famous; (2) 
it [is] distinctive; (3) the junior use [is] a commercial use in 
commerce; (4) it . . . begin[s] after the senior mark has become 
                                                          
6
  As noted by YouTube in its motion to dismiss, (Def.’s Mot. 
to Dismiss, D.E. 37-1 at 6), tarnishment is one subcategory of a 
trademark dilution claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); thus, the 
court considers Moses’s claims for contributory and vicarious 
tarnishment as part of her claims for contributory and vicarious 
trademark dilution. 
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famous; and (5) it . . . cause[s] dilution of the distinctive 
quality of the senior mark.”  Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 
F.3d 562, 577 (6th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, 
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).    
Moses claims her “Pimpin Pretty” mark has “gained 
significant recognition and goodwill among the purchasing 
public,” but does not plead with any particularity the level of 
fame it has achieved.  (See Pro Se Am. Compl., D.E. 49 ¶ 34.)   
She also states it is distinctive, but provides no factual 
details describing its distinctiveness.  (See id.)   In 
considering fame and distinctiveness, a court weighs several 
factors listed in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A), including the 
volume and geographic extent of sale of goods or services 
offered under the mark, the extent of recognition of the actual 
mark, and the extent of advertising and publicity of the mark.  
Moses offers no facts to aid the court in this evaluation.  
Because Moses again merely states the legal standard without 
providing underlying factual support, the court recommends that 
her claims for contributory and vicarious trademark dilution be 
dismissed. 
III.  RECOMMENDATION 
For the foregoing reasons, this court recommends that 
Moses’s complaint be dismissed in full pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) 
and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of 
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personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of September, 2013.  
    s/ Diane K. Vescovo___________  
            Diane K. Vescovo 
         United States Magistrate Judge 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
 
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of 
this report and recommended disposition, a party may serve and 
file written objections to the proposed findings and 
recommendations.  A party may respond to another party’s 
objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a 
copy.  FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2).  Failure to file objections 
within fourteen (14) days may constitute a waiver of objections, 
exceptions, and further appeal. 
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